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4 Public support for social integration
In chapter 3 it was argued that less successful economic integration by migrants can 
be explained not only by factors relating to their origin or discernible individual char-
acteristics, but possibly also by resistance among the indigenous population to ethnic 
minorities. This resistance could have consequences for the position of those minori-
ties and their degree of integration into the host society. The most tangible form of 
this resistance, but also the most difﬁ cult to measure, is discrimination on the labour 
market. Recent studies by the International Labour Organisation (ilo) and the Euro-
pean Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (eumc) suggest that the degree 
of this discrimination varies between eu member states (Jandl et al. 2003). One deter-
mining factor for (intended) discrimination against minorities is the extent to which 
indigenous people distance themselves from ethnic minorities (‘ethnic distance’) 
and perceive the arrival and presence of immigrants as a threat. The current public 
debate in the eu appears to focus mainly on the question of how the integration of 
immigrants can be promoted. What seems to be ignored in this debate is how will-
ing the indigenous population of the eu is to accept the social integration of immi-
grants, to what extent they are prepared to engage and interact with minorities. This 
chapter explores this public support and examines the degree of resistance shown 
by the indigenous population of the eu to social interaction with members of ethnic 
minorities: to what extent do Europeans avoid contact with members of ethnic minori-
ties at work and in their personal lives? To answer this question, the chapter looks at 
the strength of this resistance in different population groups. It also focuses on the 
role played by the economic and cultural interests of the indigenous population and 
the extent to which people believe that migrants harm those interests. Attention then 
turns to the extent to which differences between member states in ethnic distance and 
perceived ethnic threat relate with differences in economic conditions and the pres-
ence of minorities. Finally, the issue discussed in chapter 1 is revisited, namely the 
level at which indigenous residents would like decisions on immigration to be taken; 
this is linked to the perceived threat from ethnic minorities to ascertain whether there 
is a relation between these feelings and whether indigenous residents wish to keep 
decisions on immigration within their national borders or would prefer a common 
European approach. To answer these questions data were analysed from the European 
Social Survey (ess), gathered in the winter of 2002-2003.
4.1  Theory
Ethnic exclusion has often come to the surface as a reaction to the arrival of large 
groups of immigrants. In the early 1980s and 1990s strong growth in the number 
of immigrants, especially asylum-seekers, more than once caused commotion and 
unrest among a growing group of Europeans (Coenders and Scheepers 1998). How-
ever, reaction to the arrival of immigrants is only one of the many facets of ethnic 
exclusion. Research on this facet can largely be seen as a European tradition (Petti-
grew 1998). On other aspects pioneering research has been carried out largely in the 
United States, where a strong research tradition has grown aimed at explaining eth-
nocentrism, a term that is used to describe a situation where positive prejudices about 
one’s own group are accompanied by negative prejudices about other groups (Sumner 
1906; Jones 1997). Another tradition is concerned with research on resistance to the 
presence of immigrants and on the contacts between different groups in society. This 
aspect is often referred to as social or ethnic distance. It was ﬁ rst studied by Bogardus 
(1933). He expected that the more closely members of ethnic minorities approached 
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the majority, the more members of that majority would seek to maintain a distance 
and avoid actual contact (Hagendoorn 1995; Parillo and Donoghue 2002). This 
research approach is an interesting one for the recent situation in Europe, where the 
focus is mainly on the integration of migrants who are already present.
Differences between countries in the degree of ethnic distance can be explained 
among other things on the basis of the Ethnic Competition Theory (Blalock 1967; 
Olzak 1992). Brieﬂ y, this theory states that increased competition between ethnic 
groups puts interethnic relations under pressure. This occurs where people are 
competing for scarce (cultural or economic) goods, or where fewer such goods are 
available for distribution, something which the theory posits happens during immi-
gration waves or at times of economic recession. As chapters 2 and 3 of this Outlook 
have already shown that there are differences between member states in the degree 
to which these circumstances occur, this could explain differences between those 
member states in the degree of resistance to minorities.
In addition to a European comparative perspective, differences between population 
groups within a given society are also key. Earlier research has shown that certain 
population groups exclude ethnic minorities to a greater extent than other groups (see 
e.g. Coenders 2001). This heightened degree of ethnic exclusionism is often assumed 
to relate with the extent to which these groups perceive ethnic minorities as a threat 
(Quillian 1995; Scheepers et al. 2002), with groups that have more contacts with ethnic 
minorities perceiving a greater threat from them.
4.2 Ethnic distance
The traditional method for measuring ethnic distance is to gauge the degree of resis-
tance to social interaction with members of ethnic groups in various domains, such 
as within the residential neighbourhood, at work and in personal relationships. In 
the European Social Survey, respondents were asked how much they would object to 
having an immigrant as a boss at work. They were also asked how much they would 
object if a member of their family were to marry an immigrant.1 Roughly 20% of the 
population of the eu member states – in other words a substantial minority – exhib-
ited ethnic distance in their working or private lives. Figure 4.1 shows the average 
scores on ethnic distance for 19 member states.2 All ‘old member states’ are repre-
sented in the study; the new member states included are Poland, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary and Slovenia. The results show that the indigenous Dutch are close to the 
European average in their resistance to social interaction with ethnic minorities.3
1  The actual question put to respondents (in Dutch) was: ‘Thinking about people who 
have come to live in the Netherlands from another country and who are of a different 
race or ethnic group from the majority of Dutch people, to what extent do you object or 
not object to such a person being appointed as your boss, or to such a person marrying a 
close member of your family?’ Both questions were also put with respect to immigrants 
of the same race or ethnic group. Factor and lisrel analyses showed that all four items 
referred to the same concept of ethnic distance. Moreover, this measurement was found 
to exhibit cross-national equivalence, with the factor loadings being cross-nationally 
invariant.
2  The ﬁ gures shown are the averages on the constructed scale, not percentages. The items 
that refer to ethnic distance were added together and the scale reduced to a scale ranging 
from 0 to 1.
3  Respondents have the nationality of the country studied. For a detailed report of the 
ﬁ ndings and an explanation of the methods used and comparison of the measurement 
models, see Coenders et al. (2004).
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The position of the Scandinavian countries corresponds with the ﬁ ndings of previous 
research into ethnic exclusion. In Sweden and Denmark, in particular, the ethnic dis-
tance is smaller than the European average. The same applies in Western and Central 
European countries such as Luxembourg, France, Germany and Austria. The position 
of Austria is striking given its less positive position in earlier comparative research and 
given the strong support for the right-wing populist fpö (Freedom Party of Austria) 
led by Jörg Haider.4
Figure 4.1 Ethnic distance in 19 EU member states
The ethnic distance in Spain and Portugal is also below the European average. How-
ever, this smaller ethnic distance cannot be seen as a Mediterranean phenomenon, 
because ethnic distance is higher than average in Italy and especially in Greece. This 
exceptional position of Greece also emerges in other comparative research, where 
other aspects of ethnic exclusion are taken into account (Coenders et al. 2004). The 
fact that the immigrant population in Greece is proportionately many times greater 
than in the other three Mediterranean countries may be a factor here.5 A frequently 
posited post hoc explanation for the position of Greece is that the high proportion of 
illegal immigrants is related to the years of unrest in the Balkans in the 1990s. Com-
parative ﬁ gures on percentages of illegal immigrants are however not available (or not 
reliable), so that this explanation cannot be investigated further.
Belgium is the only Western European member state where the ethnic distance is 
greater than average. The idea that the right-wing Vlaams Blok party spreads ideas 
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4  Historical explanations may also play a role, but are difﬁ cult to test empirically and were 
therefore left out of consideration.
5  Although this is not shown in the Eurostat ﬁ gures presented in chapter 2. Those ﬁ gures 
are based on statistics from the 1990s; the higher percentage reported here is taken 
from the Greek census from 2001 (General Secretariat of National Statistical Services of 
Greece, 2004), in which the percentage of Albanians is considerably higher than in the 
earlier statistics.
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bordering on racism appears plausible, but runs into problems when extrapolated 
to other member states with strong or strengthening anti-immigration parties, such 
as France, Denmark and Austria: the ethnic distance in these countries is no higher 
than average, even though their anti-immigration parties are comparable in size to the 
Vlaams Blok.
In the new member states studied, ethnic distance is stronger than average in the 
Czech Republic and Slovenia, and barely deviates from the average in Poland and Hun-
gary. It is striking in this respect that the ﬁ ndings of the ilo on the level of discrimi-
nation in the four countries studied – the Netherlands, Germany, France and the uk 
– cannot simply be superimposed on the ﬁ ndings presented here. There is virtually no 
difference between the above four member states in the degree to which residents dis-
tance themselves from ethnic minorities.
4.3  Differences between population groups in ethnic distance
This section presents an impression of the ethnic distance shown by different popula-
tion groups in the total group of eu member states studied. The differences in ethnic 
distance between population groups are also shown for the member state where these 
differences are most marked.6
Figure 4.2 Ethnic distance by education level7
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6  Coefﬁ cients of association were used to investigate in which member state the cor-
relation between a characteristic and ethnic distance was strongest; the member state 
concerned was then included in the ﬁ gure.
7  The Dutch categories of secondary education mbo (senior secondary vocational educa-
tion), havo (senior general secondary education) and vwo (pre-university education) 
were combined to facilitate a European comparison. If these categories are studied 
separately for the Netherlands, people with an mbo education display a greater ethnic 
distance than the Dutch average.
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The relationship between education level and degree of resistance to ethnic minorities 
is as expected and corresponds with ﬁ ndings from earlier research: the lower the edu-
cation level, the more strongly ethnic distance is endorsed (see ﬁ gure 4.2). The differ-
ence between people with a high and low education level is a large one: twice as many 
people with a low education level support ethnic distance than university graduates. 
This difference is found in all member states, but is most pronounced in the Nether-
lands.
Differences in the degree of ethnic distance between people in different social posi-
tions – measured by the chief activity of respondents – lend themselves well to com-
parison between eu member states. As ﬁ gure 4.3 illustrates, among the working 
population, higher and lower-level professionals exhibit less ethnic distance. Manual 
workers (skilled and unskilled) and self-employed persons, by contrast, show greater 
ethnic distance. As the differences between the categories are most marked in Bel-
gium, the ﬁ ndings for that country are shown in the ﬁ gure. Not only is the average 
higher in Belgium, but it also scores higher in almost every category shown. Despite 
this, the pattern is comparable with the picture for all member states. Exceptions 
within countries to the general pattern are found when the position of routine non-
manual workers is taken into consideration. In Denmark, the Netherlands, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia the ethnic distance among this group of workers is 
higher than the average for these countries.
Figure 4.3 Ethnic distance by social position
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The general pattern suggests that in occupational groups containing relatively more 
immigrants (Kiehl and Werner 1999), the ethnic distance is actually stronger. This 
ﬁ ts in with the fact that the proportion of immigrants is above average among (skilled 
and unskilled) manual workers and self-employed persons, and that the ethnic dis-
tance is greater in these groups. This ﬁ nding is also in line with the expectation that 
a higher presence of ethnic groups poses a threat to those occupational groups which 
have more contacts with ethnic minorities in practice. In other words, it would seem 
that it is easy to profess little ethnic distance when one has few contacts with ethnic 
minorities, as is the case for (lower and higher-level) professionals. The earlier chap-
ters showed that the labour market structure is not the same in all countries and that 
in Southern Europe in particular ethnic minorities perform relatively well in terms of 
labour market participation. According to Kiehl and Werner (1999), in these member 
states, too, minorities from outside the eu are also employed mainly in ‘elementary 
occupations’, and it is plausible that it is mainly indigenous manual workers who 
therefore perceive ethnic minorities as a threat.
When the groups who are not active on the labour market are considered, it is striking 
that pensioners and housewives/househusbands (‘in household’ in the ﬁ gure) show 
more ethnic distance than average. Finally, the unemployed in the member states stud-
ied also show an above-average distance to ethnic minorities, though there are dif-
ferences of degree. In the new member states studied, for example, the unemployed 
show a lower ethnic distance than average.
Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between income and ethnic distance.8 The fact that 
low-income groups show slightly more evidence of ethnic distance than the higher 
income categories ﬁ ts in with the above ﬁ ndings with regard to education and social 
position. Yet the differences between the income categories are smaller than the dif-
ferences found between different education categories or the groups distinguished 
by social position. In fact in many member states there is virtually no relationship to 
be found. This applies in particular for the Eastern and Southern European member 
states. The biggest differences between income categories are found in the uk, and 
are therefore included in the ﬁ gure.
Older persons show much more ethnic distance than younger people (see ﬁ gure 4.5). 
People aged over 70 have the least desire to have anything to do with members of 
ethnic minorities; this feeling is almost twice as strong as among those in their twen-
ties. It is striking to note however that in many member states a change is taking place 
in the youngest age group: the ethnic distance among teenagers is greater than among 
people in their twenties and thirties. The uk serves as an example in the ﬁ gure.
8  Income was measured as net household income. As a relatively large number of respon-
dents did not state their income, the missing value substitution technique was used, 
with income being estimated on the basis of education level, social position, age, sex, 
civil status and presence of a partner or children. 
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Figure 4.4 Ethnic distance by income quartile
Figure 4.5 Ethnic distance by age category
Figure 4.6 portrays the degree of ethnic distance according to degree of urbanisation. 
Interestingly, ethnic distance is found to be strongest in villages and rural areas. This 
applies particularly in Austria and Slovenia, but a similar pattern is also found in most 
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other member states.9 In contrast to the picture portrayed in the (West-European) 
media, namely that resistance to minorities is greatest in the large cities, these ﬁ ndings 
show that ethnic distance in the largest cities is actually the lowest. Although the ethnic 
competition theory suggested that the presence of minorities leads to a greater degree 
of competition, another mechanism may be at work here. Opportunities for contacts 
with ethnic minorities are greater in the towns and cities because of the concentra-
tion of immigrants in urban areas, especially in Western Europe. The ‘contact theory’ 
posits that actual contact can reduce the perceived threat from ethnic groups (Allport 
1954; Gijsberts and Dagevos 2004). Distrust of the unfamiliar could then feature more 
strongly in rural areas than for people living in urban districts. In the countries of East-
ern Europe, where ethnic groups including Roma are also relatively strongly repre-
sented outside the major cities, it is plausible that the competition theory does apply.
Figure 4.6 Ethnic distance by degree of urbanisation
4.4  Explanations for ethnic distance
The next step in the analysis is to explain differences between countries in the degree 
of ethnic distance and to identify the determinants.10 This will indicate the extent to 
which ethnic distance can be explained on the basis of individual and national char-
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9  Italy forms an exception here, as the ethnic distance is slightly greater in the large cities. 
In Greece, the ethnic distance is greatest in villages, in line with the general ﬁ nding, but 
after this is strongest in the large cities.
10  This multivariate analysis is a multilevel analysis in which the variance components are 
separated at individual and country level. For a description of the model structure and 
the goodness of ﬁ t, see Coenders et al. (2004).
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acteristics. The analyses are based on data on 18 member states drawn from the Euro-
pean Social Survey.11
The individual characteristics that explain ethnic distance are shown in Appendix 4.1 
(table 4.1, ﬁ rst model). The effect of education is especially strong, with people with a 
higher education background showing less ethnic distance. The difference observed 
earlier between income categories disappears, however: the difference in ethnic dis-
tance shown by high and low income categories is attributable to differences in their 
education and social position. The differences between population groups are also 
virtually the same as the earlier ﬁ ndings. Variation in the population proﬁ le between 
countries gives an indication for differences in their degree of ethnic distance: coun-
tries with a higher proportion of indigenous people with a low education level show a 
higher degree of ethnic distance. These are referred to as composition effects.12
Interestingly enough, virtually no relation is found between ethnic distance and low 
gdp or high unemployment.13 Even the percentage of ethnic minorities, the net 
migration in the second half of the 1990s and the inﬂ ux of asylum-seekers tell us little 
– within this selection of member states – about the extent of differences in resistance 
to ethnic minorities between member states.
The extent to which people perceive ethnic minorities as a threat proves to be highly 
relevant in explaining ethnic distance. In model three in table 4.1 (Appendix 4.1) this 
explanation is included alongside other perceptions. The effect is very strong, with 
people who perceive a greater threat from ethnic minorities maintaining a greater dis-
tance to them. Interestingly, social and political distrust have no direct effect on ethnic 
distance.14 People who feel unsafe do however show greater ethnic distance.15 Finally, 
there is conﬁ rmation that people with a ‘right-wing’ political orientation have a stron-
ger desire to keep ethnic minorities at a distance than people on the left of the political 
spectrum.
11  It should be noted that France was left out of these multivariate analyses because the 
French data were published just before the appearance of this report. France is however 
included in the European average described earlier. In addition, the former East and 
West Germany were treated separately in the multivariate analysis.
12  At the bottom of table 4.1 in Appendix 4.1 it is stated that 20.7% of the variance in ethnic 
distance between member states is explained by including individual characteristics.
13  The measures used for the country characteristics are described in Appendix 4.2.
14  Social distrust was measured on the basis of three items, which together form a reliable 
scale (Cronbachs alpha =.77); ‘Generally speaking, do you think that most people can be 
trusted or that you cannot be careful enough in dealing with people?’; ‘Do you think that 
most people would try to take advantage of you if they had the chance, or would they try 
to be honest?’; ‘Do you think that most people try to be helpful or do you think that they 
usually think only of themselves?’.
Political distrust was measured using four items, which together form a reliable scale 
(Cronbachs alpha = .76); ‘Generally speaking, do think that politicians are concerned 
about what people like you think?’; ‘Do you think that politicians are interested only in 
getting people’s votes, and less interested in people’s views?’; ‘On a scale of 0 to 10, can 
you indicate how much trust you have in the Dutch parliament?’; ‘On a scale of 0 to 10, 
can you indicate how much trust you have in politicians?’.
15  Perceived lack of personal safety was measured using the question: ‘How safe do you feel 
– or would you feel – if you (were to) walk around this neighbourhood in the dark?’. It 
should be noted that actual victimhood does not have a (direct) effect on ethnic distance; 
this effect is not included in the table. Actual victimhood was measured using the ques-
tion: ‘Have you or has anyone in your household been a victim of a burglary or of physi-
cal violence during the last ﬁ ve years?’.
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As countries differ in the extent of perceived ethnic threat, this aspect also offers an 
explanation for differences between countries in the degree of ethnic distance. In 
other words, the ethnic distance in a given country is greater because people there per-
ceive a greater threat from ethnic minorities. Time, then, to look in more depth at this 
perceived threat.
4.5  Perceived threat from ethnic minorities
The questions put to respondents refer both to economic and cultural ethnic threat. 
They explore whether people fear that immigrants ‘steal jobs’, ‘cost more than they 
contribute’ and ‘are bad for the economy’, or whether migrants ‘undermine their cul-
ture’ or ‘make the country a worse place to live’. One question looks at the relationship 
between immigrants and crime, and asks respondents whether the problem of crime 
has become worse due to the arrival of people from other countries. Despite these dif-
ferent domains in which perceived ethnic threat can be situated, the response patterns 
relate so strongly that it can conﬁ dently be said that all these aspects refer to the over-
arching concept of a ‘perceived threat from ethnic minorities’. More than half the pop-
ulation of the eu perceive some level of threat from the immigrants in their country. 
There are however wide differences between member states, with – once again – the 
position of the Greeks standing out (see ﬁ gure 4.7);16 there is no other country where 
the perceived ethnic threat is as high as in Greece.
Apart from Greece, the new member states Hungary and the Czech Republic also 
stand out, with a perceived threat from ethnic minorities that is above the European 
average. The sensitive relations with the large Roma minority play a role in these coun-
tries, but evidently people also see the arrival and presence of immigrants in general 
as a threat. In Poland and Slovenia – the other new member states considered in this 
study – the perceived ethnic threat is close to the European average.
Figure 4.7  Perceived threat from ethnic minorities in 19 EU member states
EU average
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16  The ﬁ gures shown are the averages on the constructed scale, not percentages. The items 
that refer to ethnic threat were added together and the scale reduced to a scale ranging 
from 0 to 1.
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In the West-European member states, the perceived ethnic threat is somewhat stron-
ger in the uk and Belgium. In Denmark and Austria, two member states which occa-
sionally recorded above-average scores in the 1990s for negative attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities (Quillian 1995), the perceived ethnic threat is in fact below the aver-
age. This is also the case in the other Scandinavian member states and in Luxembourg. 
It would seem that to some degree people in the wealthier member states see ethnic 
minorities as less of a threat than people in the less prosperous countries.
4.6  Explanations for perceived ethnic threat
Like ethnic distance, perceived ethnic threat is greater among people with a low educa-
tion level and people with a low income (see Table 4.2 in Appendix 4.1). These groups 
are more afraid that ethnic minorities will harm the economy, ‘steal’ jobs and ‘under-
mine’ the culture of the host country. Self-employed persons and manual workers feel 
this threat to greater extent than people working in professions at the upper end of the 
social ladder. The unemployed, pensioners and people working in the household also 
see a greater threat from ethnic minorities. The rural population perceive a greater 
threat than people living in towns.
The perceived threat from ethnic minorities can be clearly linked to the national con-
text. It is signiﬁ cantly smaller in countries with stronger economies, measured by 
the size of their gdp, though to some extent the inﬂ uence of gdp is cancelled out 
by the presence and arrival of ethnic minorities; this is not surprising given that – as 
described in chapters 2 and 3 – the wealthier member states attract more immigrants. 
The analyses show that in member states where the percentage of ethnic minorities is 
higher and where net migration has been stronger, the perceived threat from ethnic 
minorities is also higher. The unemployment rate and number of asylum requests are 
found to have no inﬂ uence on the perceived ethnic threat.
Finally, the study looked at the importance of individual perceptions for the perceived 
threat from ethnic minorities. People who regard themselves as being on the politi-
cal right perceive a greater ethnic threat. In addition, a general distrust of others is 
accompanied by a higher perceived ethnic threat; people who feel unsafe also perceive 
a greater ethnic threat. As became clear for the Dutch situation in chapter 1 of this 
report, there is moreover a fairly strong correlation between distrust of politics and 
the perceived threat from ethnic minorities. There is a dilemma here, in that it will be 
difﬁ cult for the government and/or establishment politics to remove perceived ethnic 
threat, whereas the group who perceive this threat will readily respond to the mes-
sages of populist political leaders.
4.7  Perceived ethnic threat and allocation of responsibility for immigration policy
Finally, this chapter shows the extent to which perceived ethnic threat determines 
people’s preference as to where decisions on immigration policy are taken. Do Euro-
peans want decisions on immigration to be taken by their own national governments 
or would they prefer a European or international approach, and to what extent does 
ethnic threat play a role in these preferences? One ﬁ nding that can be stated straight 
away is that most people support a multinational approach to immigration; the degree 
of perceived ethnic threat has little inﬂ uence on this. Differences are however found 
when preferences for the eu and for the national state are compared (see ﬁ gure 4.8). 
It then emerges that people who perceive a threat from ethnic minorities are more in 
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favour of keeping decisions on immigration at the national level and are less inclined 
to favour a European approach.
The relation found between perceived ethnic threat and the preferred level of deci-
sion-making is particularly strong in France, but a comparable pattern is found in all 
member states included in the study, with the striking exception of Italy, Portugal and 
Spain, where such a relation is virtually absent. It may be that the speciﬁ c experiences 
in these member states with overseas refugees mean that even people who perceive 
immigrants as a threat would like to see European or other international cooperation 
on immigration.
Figure 4.8 Preferred decision-making level on immigration
Preferred decision-making level on immigration by the population of the EU member states, subdivided into three sub-popula-
tions: those who perceive no threat from ethnic minorities, those who perceive an average threat and those who perceive a high 
threat.
4.8  Concluding remarks
The population of the eu member states perceive a fairly high level of economic and 
cultural threat from ethnic minorities. This perceived threat is in turn a major reason 
for keeping ethnic minorities at a distance in people’s day-to-day lives. This phenom-
enon is particularly strong in Greece, where people feel very threatened by the arrival 
and presence of ethnic minorities. The perceived threat in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary is also signiﬁ cantly greater than in the other member states. Among the 
West-European member states, only Belgium records both a higher than average per-
ceived ethnic threat and ethnic distance.
The empirical ﬁ ndings for 2002-2003 suggest that the resistance to ethnic minorities 
in the Netherlands after the turbulent year 2002 is not exceptionally high compared 
with other member states. While the ﬁ ndings conﬁ rm that the Netherlands has no 
reason to congratulate itself on account of the tolerance for which it was once famed, 
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the ﬁ gures do not support the idea that the Netherlands has ‘swung too far the other 
way’ and become especially intolerant. In a European perspective, the Netherlands 
occupies a solid middle position. People in the Scandinavian countries, Austria and 
Luxembourg are less troubled by ethnic distance. Moreover, people in the Scandina-
vian member states and in Luxembourg perceive an economic and cultural threat from 
ethnic minorities to a much lesser extent than in the other member states.
Differences in ethnic distance between the member states could not be explained in 
this study by the country characteristics included in the study. The degree to which 
residents of the different member states vary in the perceived threat from ethnic 
minorities does however offer an explanation for differences in ethnic distance. To 
some extent, this economic and cultural threat is determined directly by the context. In 
countries with a weaker economy (expressed as a lower gdp) and in countries where 
net migration has been higher and where the percentage of ethnic minorities living in 
the country is larger, there is a greater perceived ethnic threat. For Greece, which has 
a lower gdp and has seen a relatively large increase in its immigrant population, this 
could explain the high level of perceived threat from ethnic minorities.
If the ﬁ ndings in chapters 2 and 3 on unemployment and the activity rate of immi-
grants are extrapolated to this chapter, it becomes apparent that the perceived ethnic 
threat is lower in member states where ethnic minorities are doing less well on the 
labour market. International differences in the degree of ethnic distance and ethnic 
threat thus appear unable to explain why ethnic minorities perform less well on the 
labour market in these member states. It may be that a trend study could offer a more 
pertinent answer to this question. Based on the present ﬁ ndings it could be concluded 
that when ethnic minorities perform relatively well on the labour market in compari-
son to the indigenous population, and when new migrants enter the jobs market, 
the perceived threat from ethnic minorities will be high. Admitting immigrants in 
order to make up for the decline in the indigenous population brings the danger that 
tensions will arise between the two groups if native citizens have the idea that they 
are being passed over in favour of ethnic minorities. Finally, it should be noted that 
although there is wide variation between member states, the perceived threat from 
ethnic minorities is considerable in all countries studied, including in the Scandina-
vian member states.
The differences found between population groups are reasonably consistent: people 
with a limited education level are found to exhibit stronger resistance to ethnic minor-
ities than people with a higher education background. The same applies for manual 
workers and self-employed persons. The explanation found for this is that these 
groups perceive a greater threat from ethnic minorities than other sections of the pop-
ulation. To some extent the same applies for people living in villages and in the coun-
tryside because – strikingly enough – the perceived threat from ethnic minorities was 
found to be higher precisely in these areas.
The importance of social and political distrust also became clear; both aspects relate 
strongly with perceived threat from ethnic minorities. This means that policymakers 
will have a difﬁ cult task in reaching people who perceive a threat from ethnic minori-
ties. Finally, people who perceive a threat from ethnic minorities are more strongly 
in favour than people who perceive little ethnic threat of keeping immigration policy 
decisions at national level.
